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PREVENTION THROUGH 
DETERRENCE ALONG EGYPT’S 
NORTHEASTERN BORDER
Or the Politics of a Weaponized Desert
Ellen Morris 
Throughout its history, Egypt’s governments were 
 concerned at its northeastern border both to keep 
would-be fugitives in and to keep would-be migrants 
and invaders out. Adopting a system of structural 
violence that bears similarity to America’s policy of 
Prevention Through Deterrence on its southern bor-
der, the government fortified and policed the easiest 
points of entry across its official borders. Beyond that, 
however, it guarded water sources and relied upon 
the North Sinai desert to kill or grievously injure any 
intruders that ventured to cross it. This article consid-
ers the parallels between policies of border control in 
ancient Egypt and those currently practiced by the 
United States government with respect to Mexico. 
Moreover, it argues that the Sinai desert served as a 
shatter zone for the Pharaonic state and that local resi-
dents thus had the power either to sabotage or to bol-
ster the efforts of a regime to secure its border.




Although the mechanics of Pharaonic border control are 
relatively well known, the inherent structural violence 
of the system remains unaddressed. This article seeks 
to highlight the Egyptian state’s delegation of violence 
along its border to a whole host of non-human actors by 
comparing the Pharaonic system to the current policy of 
Prevention Through Deterrence as it is practiced along 
the boundary that divides the United States and Mexico. 
As shall be seen, the Egyptian state, like its American 
equivalent, relied for border control not only on walls 
and other physical barriers but also on the harsh environ-
ment that lay just beyond them. The article considers the 
effects of this present-day policy in an effort to deepen 
our understanding of its ancient equivalent. It also exam-
ines the manner in which the Bedouin of Egypt’s Sinai 
desert, like the Samaritans, smugglers, and bandits that 
now frequent the Sonoran desert and other such locales 
along the U.S.–Mexican border, occupy an ambivalent 
position as actors who, depending upon their motiva-
tion, might facilitate dangerous passages or else prey 
upon those seeking to cross unaided.
Since 1994, the United States government has prac-
ticed a policy of border control known as Prevention 
Through Deterrence. Due to the thousands of deaths 
that have thus far resulted from its adoption, activ-
ists have criticized the strategy, seeking to unmask the 
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structural violence that it entails (De León 2015). At 
its core, the policy mandates that any portion of the 
border that can be crossed with relative ease should be 
walled and surveilled. This is a marked departure from 
earlier practices in which the border between the two 
countries was porous, fences being either nonexistent 
or else far more symbolic than effectual. Thus, in times 
past the emphasis lay not on catching people as they 
crossed, but rather on apprehending those who sought 
to reside permanently in the United States without 
permission.
Under the provisions of Prevention Through 
Deterrence the government erected hi-tech fencing 
and radically increased the numbers of border control 
agents in order to thwart those that attempted to climb 
over, cut through, or tunnel under a fence. As the name 
of the policy implies, however, walls comprise only a 
portion of its equation. The effect of the walls, which 
provide a barrier for roughly a third of the 3,145 km 
border, is to funnel would-be migrants into harsh and 
waterless terrain or to force them to cross dangerous 
waterways. As the architects of this policy acknowl-
edged, “Illegal entrants crossing through remote, unin-
habited expanses of land and sea along the border can 
find themselves in mortal danger” (U.S. Border Patrol 
1994: 2). The numbers of documented deaths per year 
between 1998 and 2008 ranged between 356 and 529 
(Jimenez 2009: 18). Utilizing these statistics, by the 
start of 2017 the numbers of documented dead would 
be approximately 8,000. Untold numbers of corpses 
swept away by currents or devoured and scattered by 
scavengers remain uncounted.
The United States’ adoption of this policy had much 
to do with a sharp spike in illegal immigration resulting 
in part from changes subsequent to the adoption of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement, which put many 
Mexican farmers out of work. Prompted by a convergence 
of hardships, Mexicans and other southerners began to 
cross the border in unprecedented numbers and prompted 
the United States to take a much harder-line stance toward 
immigration than had been the case in the past.
The hardships that provoked a large-scale migration 
of Canaanites into Egypt at the end of the third mil-
lennium BCE appear to have been primarily ecological 
rather than economic. The effects, however, may have 
been similarly dramatic. This increased immigration, if 
the “ pessimistic literature” of the period may be trusted, 
prompted a societal outcry and resulted in attempts by 
Egypt’s  government to more effectively cordon off the 
country’s northeastern border.
About border control in and before the Old Kingdom 
we know very little, having no archaeological evidence and 
only a handful of enigmatic references in surviving texts. 
There was presumably some effort to keep people in the 
country, judging both from the emphasis on surveillance at 
large-scale work sites like the Giza Workmen’s Village and 
from later penalties imposed upon those who sought to 
avoid corvée labor. Keeping people out of the country, how-
ever, does not seem to have been a pressing concern. The 
free and relatively modest city-states of Canaan posed little 
threat, and one might perhaps safely assume that living 
under the heavy hand of the Egyptian state was not viewed 
as desirable so long as Canaan had fertile fields, orchards, 
and flocks that could grow fat off the fruit of the land.
This situation may well have changed, however, 
around 2500 BCE, when increasing aridity throughout 
Africa and the ancient Near East caused the collapse 
of the Early Bronze III urban culture in Syria-Palestine 
and made life far more tenuous for anyone occupying 
a marginal area (Höflmayer 2015). The effects of this 
climate change on Egypt’s environs are visible in art 
as early as the Fifth Dynasty (ca. 2480 BCE) in scenes 
carved on the pyramid causeways of Sahure and Unas 
(Fig. 1). Here the suffering of desert peoples during this 
extended period of drought is purposefully contrasted 
with the plenty enjoyed by those lucky enough to live 
by the banks of the Nile—that is, until Egypt’s own 
floods began to fail.
Economic hardship and perhaps also upheavals related 
to the process of de-urbanization in Canaan seem to have 
prompted many Easterners to resettle in the Nile Delta. 
Thus, by the time Egypt’s central government collapsed 
at the end of the Sixth Dynasty and low Niles caught 
up with already existing arid conditions, Egyptians may 
have found themselves competing for resources with 
those they viewed as cultural outsiders (Hassan 2007: 
359–60). Egypt’s first foray into virulent anti-immigrant 
xenophobia, then, came during the First Intermediate 
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Period at the end of the third millennium BCE. The 
authors of the so-called pessimistic literature aimed to 
capture the tenor of the times for tendentious purposes 
of their own. Thanks to present-day recessions, increased 
migrations, and inflammatory political invectives, how-
ever, the recorded rhetoric rings fresh, and there is no 
reason to suppose that the prevailing sentiments were 
entirely invented.
A purported eyewitness named Ipuwer, for example, 
laments that “Verily, the desert pervades the land, the 
nomes are annihilated, and foreign aliens have come to 
Egypt. . . . Moreover, all the foreigners claim ‘This is our 
water! These are our crops!’” (Simpson 2003: 192, 193). 
According to Ipuwer, “Foreigners have become Egyptians 
in every place. . . . And nomads are (now) experts in the 
professions of the Delta” (Simpson 2003: 190). A similar 
situation is “predicted” by a fictional sage named Neferty, 
who foresees that “Foreign birds will breed in the Delta 
marshes, having made their nests beside the people, for 
men have let them approach through laxness . . . And the 
land is plunged into anguish by those voracious Asiatics 
who rove throughout the land” (Simpson 2003: 217). 
Digested into a familiar sound bite: The crisis at hand was 
that foreigners had entered the homeland, were commit-
ting depredations or taking profitable jobs that would 
otherwise have been filled by nationals, and were success-
fully insinuating themselves into society. According to 
the narrators of these texts (and, no doubt, the political 
agenda of those that sponsored them), the land required 
an enterprising ruler to stem this tide.1
Barriers with Teeth
Attempts to deal with this unwanted immigration are 
first articulated, in literature at least, by a ruler of the 
kingdom that held the northern portion of the country in 
the late First Intermediate Period. This king—in all likeli-
hood a member of the family of Khety—purportedly left 
a document to his son Merikare in which he explained his 
philosophy on ruling justly, touted his successful policy 
decisions, and (uniquely for an Egyptian king) expressed 
regret for his mistakes. Among his successes as ruler, he 
cited his three-pronged approach to staunch this tide of 
illegal immigration.
First, he levied troops to round up foreign popula-
tions that were considered dangerous. He destroyed their 
settlements, captured their people and their cattle, and 
did this until he had made them “detest” Egypt (Simpson 
2003: 161). Second, he encouraged large-scale settlement 
in the Eastern Delta. As he put it, the region was now 
“well settled with towns and full of people, the choicest 
of the entire land, to drive back any attacks against them” 
(Simpson 2003: 161). The new settlers in this project of 
internal colonization, then, were given tax-free status 
in order to compensate them for agreeing to inhabit a 
F I G .  1
Starving Bedouin from the causeways of Sahure (left) and Unas (right). (Redrawn from Hawass and  
Verner 1996: 185, fig. 2a and Drioton 1943: 49, fig. 3.) 
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F I G .  2
Map showing Pharaonic canal traces and the ancient coastline.  
(Redrawn after a map produced by the Geological Survey of  
Israel in Hoffmeier 2006: 3, fig. 1.)
dangerous frontier zone. Their walls were fortified, and 
their soldiers, citizens, and serfs, were given training in 
war so that they knew how to bear arms, should they 
come under siege. In point of fact, however, as the king 
stated, the likelihood of them having to mount such a 
defense was remote. For, as he put it, “the Asiatic is only 
a crocodile on its riverbank, which attacks on a lonely 
road but does not invade the area of a crowded town” 
(Simpson 2003: 161–62).
The third prong, however, was the most important 
for present purposes. The border itself had to be sealed, 
such that those who hazarded the journey across the 
Sinai land bridge would be stopped, dead in their tracks 
as it were, at the border. To this end, the king advocated 
the use of canals edged with what he described as war-
like walls. The text and toponyms here present some dif-
ficulty to the translator, but it would appear that the king 
was suggesting that the key to Egypt’s defense against 
the eastern bowmen was to construct a canal that tra-
versed vulnerable points of entry. To make this happen, 
water could be diverted from the Pelusiac branch of the 
Nile, from various canals, and from a number of brackish 
lakes and lagoons.
Portions of a canal that would have served just 
this purpose were identified in the 1970s, although 
their date remains uncertain. This canal ran from the 
ancient shoreline somewhat near what was to become 
Pelusium southward, cross-cutting the easternmost tip 
of the Delta. Eventually, this canal led to El Balah Lake 
and then south to Lake Timsah (Fig. 2). The western 
perimeter of the frontier canal was in all likelihood 
edged by a substantial wall, whose bricks were made 
from the mud excavated to form the canal. The “Walls 
of the Ruler,” as the earliest defenses were known, are 
referenced in a variety of ancient documents (Shea 
1977: 35–38; Hoffmeier 2006).
It is quite probable, however, that this border secu-
rity system, when fully constructed, relied less on the 
strength of its fortifications than it did on the vicious-
ness of its crocodiles. The well-watered southern-
most passage out of Egypt, the Wadi Tumilat, ended 
abruptly in a lake whose modern name is Lake Timsah, 
or Crocodile Lake. This body of water was brackish but 
marshy and offered an ideal environment for croco-
diles. The presence of crocodiles in such a vital strategic 
 location may not only have been tolerated, it may, per-
haps, have been encouraged. Certainly, a waterway pos-
itively crammed with crocodiles, labeled “the dividing 
waters,” appears in a schematic rendering of Egypt’s 
border defense system, as it existed during the reign 
of Seti I (ca. 1290 BCE; see Fig. 3). Recent excavations 
have revealed that the fortress of Tjaru (Hebua II) was 
indeed separated from an unnamed counterpart to its 
west (corresponding to the right side of the waterway 
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in Fig. 3) by a Nile distributary that could easily have 
supported a robust population of crocodiles (Shea 1977; 
Hoffmeier 2013: 168–69).
The employment of crocodiles as de facto border 
control agents is observed elsewhere. For example, 
the crocodiles that frequent the Limpopo River, which 
separates Zimbabwe and Mozambique from South 
Africa, are acknowledged—along with lions, electrical 
fences, and land mines—to be one of the most impor-
tant checks on cross-border migration. According to 
news reports, border police patrolling this river rou-
tinely find corpses partially devoured, some cached in 
caves by crocodiles (Fields 2014). Perhaps not surpris-
ingly, death by crocodile constituted a particular hor-
ror in the Egyptian mindset, and the punishment of 
being thrown to a crocodile is attested in a legal oath 
as well as in a tale from the late Middle Kingdom or 
early Second Intermediate Period (McDowell 1990: 174; 
Simpson 2003: 16).
One particularly vivid account of the danger croco-
diles posed to those who forded infested waters can be 
found in an account of Perdiccas’s ill-fated invasion of 
Egypt in 320 BCE. By all accounts, this campaign was 
managed disastrously. Briefly, it saw Perdiccas earning 
enmity by badly botching an attempt to redirect a canal 
and by pressing his men to march at breakneck speed 
during nights that followed difficult days. After his 
second attempt at making a crossing unopposed, he 
and his army arrived at a region of Memphis where an 
island in the Nile seemed to offer hope that the third 
time might be the charm. (Diodorus Siculus, Library 
18.33–34)
To ease the passage of his army across the river, 
Perdiccas came up with a seemingly clever stratagem, 
namely to place elephants upstream of the wading troops 
in order to break the force of the current and to place 
mounted horsemen downstream to catch any soldiers 
who lost their footing. Although the tactic worked at 
first, the tread of the animals disrupted the silt causing 
the bottom of the river to suddenly deepen precipitously. 
Stronger swimmers made it across with great difficulty, 
after shedding much of their equipment, but the rest 
were swept away by the river only to be devoured by 
crocodiles or drowned and washed up at the feet of the 
enemy (Diodorus Siculus, Library 18.35–36). Not surpris-
ingly, after so many glorious failures, Perdiccas fell to 
the  daggers of his own officers, and the campaign was 
aborted (Fig. 4).
F I G .  3
Relief depicted on the walls of Karnak temple showing Seti I returning home by way of the militarized highway along  
the North Sinai from a campaign against the Shasu Bedouin. (Redrawn from Gardiner 1920: pl. XI.) 
This content downloaded from 128.59.222.107 on Fri, 09 Jun 2017 17:28:02 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
138  |  P R E V E N T I O N  T H R O U G H  D E T E R R E N C E  A L O N G  E G Y P T ’S  N O R T H E A S T E R N  B O R D E R
It is important to note that if the point of entry 
that Perdiccas chose was deemed the safest spot for 
a well-equipped Hellenistic army to cross—after the 
entirety of the eastern edge of the Delta had been 
 reconnoitered—Egypt must indeed have been difficult 
of access. This was certainly the assessment of classi-
cal authors such as Josephus (J. W. 4.10.5) and Strabo 
(Geogr. 17.21), and it must have also been the assess-
ment of the leaders and participants of well over 30 
(mostly unsuccessful) invasions launched between the 
seventh century BCE and the first century CE (Figueras 
2000: 95–102; Kahn and Tammuz 2008: 39). Deserts 
protected Egypt to the east and west, and a series of 
cataracts prevented penetration by river from the 
south. Even entry by sea was problematic, given the 
fact that Egypt’s coast was both riddled with sandbars 
and possessed of only a few viable harbors. Fortified on 
all sides by nature, then, Egypt’s few vulnerable points 
of entry could be secured in a remarkably effective 
manner from a period quite early in its history.
After their beginnings in the First Intermediate 
Period, the Walls of the Ruler were significantly aug-
mented by the new Twelfth Dynasty regime that took 
power around 1990 BCE. It is fascinating and perhaps 
counterintuitive that the first individual that we hear 
of managing to avoid this system and to pass through 
to the other side was not a foreign bowman desperate 
to reap the benefits of life in Egypt, but rather a very 
alarmed courtier, named Sinuhe, who feared being fin-
gered as part of the conspiracy that had recently killed 
a king. According to this early example of historical 
fiction, told in the first person, Sinuhe lost no time in 
heading for the border. He states, “I gave a path to my 
feet northward (until) I touched the Walls of the Ruler, 
which had been made to check the Asiatics and to crush 
the sand-travelers. I took a crouched position in the 
brush out of fear that the guard on duty on the walls 
might see. I went by night” (Simpson 2003: 56). To pre-
vent just such an occurrence, desert scouts fanned out 
in the mornings to read the landscape for signs of illicit 
passage. Sinuhe, however, evidently covered his tracks.
The fictional courtier thus succeeded in the first 
stage of his flight. But as the Middle Kingdom secu-
rity specialists knew, breaking through the Walls of 
the Ruler was only the beginning of a fugitive’s perils. 
There still remained roughly 220 km of largely water-
less terrain that separated him from the sown land of 
Canaan.
F I G .  4
Like Perdiccas’s soldiers, 
unsuspecting Roman troops 
approach crocodiles. (After 
Faits des Romains, aux armes 
de la famille Le Pele, fifteenth 
century CE; Bibliothèque 
nationale de France, 
Department of Manuscripts, 
French 22540.)
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Crossing a Weaponized Desert
Concerning his journey across the desert, Sinuhe states, 
“Thirst overcame me and it hastened me on; I was parched, 
my throat dry. And I said: This is the taste of death” 
(Simpson 2003: 56). Had it not been for the timely arrival 
of a group of Bedouin, the fugitive felt that he would surely 
have perished. Although the narrative is fictional, the power 
of an arid landscape to maim or to kill those who attempt 
to traverse it without proper equipment, local knowledge, 
or aid is well known. The term ‘weaponized desert’ has thus 
been utilized to describe the employment by policy-makers 
of wastelands to severely weaken or indeed eliminate 
migrants before they enter settled regions of the United 
States.2 The same term is equally applicable to the use by 
various governments of the Sinai desert.
Numbering among the weapons in Egypt’s arse-
nal was quicksand. In and around Pelusium and Lake 
Bardawil difficulty was posed to the traveller by marshes, 
a lack of potable water, and shifting sands. Regarding the 
latter, Diodorus Siculus reported that crossing the des-
ert in the environs of Lake Bardawil offered unexpected 
perils to those ignorant of the terrain. Portions of the 
lake were often covered by dunes and could be mistaken 
for solid ground. Diodorus wrote that the sand, when 
walked upon, gave way “but gradually, deceiving with 
a kind of malevolent cunning those who advance upon 
it. . . Anyone who has been sucked in by the mire cannot 
swim, since the slime prevents all movement of the body, 
nor is he able to wade out, since he has no solid footing” 
(Library 1.30.7–8). Diodorus went on to note that because 
of this mixing of sand with water the affected terrain 
could be traversed neither by foot nor by boat. Individual 
travelers and armies, such as a portion of that led by the 
Persian king Artaxerxes III in 343 BCE, often came to this 
realization too late (Library 16.46.4–5; Fig. 5).
F I G .  5
Roman soldiers mired in quicksand. (After Romuleon by Robert Della Porta, fifteenth century CE;  
Bibliothèque nationale de France, Department of Manuscripts, French 364.)
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Quicksand is, of course, not an obstacle encountered 
in the Sonoran desert by those seeking to bypass the 
recently erected American walls. Many of the other 
difficulties encountered by such migrants, however, 
were indeed shared by individuals who sought to pass 
over the Sinai desert undetected by state authori-
ties. Such difficulties are well documented, but rarely 
more eloquently than by Jason De León in his new 
book, The  Land of Open Graves. De León, an anthro-
pologist at  the University of Michigan, directs the 
Undocumented Migration Project, which seeks through 
ethno- archaeological fieldwork to expose the structural 
violence that lurks behind the bureaucratic language 
of American foreign policy.
The official description of the Prevention Through 
Deterrence policy predicts “that with traditional entry 
and smuggling routes disrupted, illegal traffic will be 
deterred, or forced over more hostile terrain, less suited 
for crossing and more suited for enforcement” (U.S. 
Border Patrol 1994: 7). Questioning the deliberate steril-
ity of this description, De Léon asks “What hides in the 
shadows of so-called ‘hostile’ terrain? Flesh-roasting 
temperatures? . . . . What about venomous snakebites 
or bandits with a propensity for gang rape? Shoes that 
break apart after staggering in them for miles over 
lonely mountains? An undiagnosed heart condition 
exacerbated by days in the desert? Although all of these 
things (and countless others) have become incorpo-
rated into the Border Patrol’s system of enforcement, 
none of these realities are captured by policy rhetoric” 
(De León 2015: 39).
Venomous creatures certainly make their appear-
ance in ancient accounts. About the Sinai highway, 
Strabo states that “in addition to its being waterless and 
sandy, it contains a multitude of reptiles, the sand bur-
rowers” (Geogr. 17.21). The Assyrian king Esarhaddon 
who crossed the Sinai with his army in the seventh cen-
tury BCE knew of this first hand and was clearly trau-
matized by “serpents [whose attack] (spelled) death” 
and the rather enigmatic “green [animals] whose wings 
were batting” (Pritchard 1974: 292). Similarly, Lucan 
reports that Cato the Younger warned his troops in 
advance of their long march across the Libyan des-
ert west of Egypt, stating, “We march towards barren 
plains and the furnace of the world, where the sun’s 
heat is excessive and water is seldom found in the 
springs. And where the parched fields are foul with ven-
omous serpents” (Lucan, Pharsalia 9.382–84). As to the 
nature of the venomous serpents, Lucan expounded at 
great length, detailing the gruesome (and gruesomely 
various) ways in which those who fell to their fangs 
collapsed and died—always in agony. Indeed, serpents 
even attacked the soldiers as they slept, attracted by 
the warmth of their bodies.
In a fitting testament to effectiveness of the desert 
as its own weapon, Cato’s soldiers purportedly lamented 
that “[t]he vipers fight in Caesar’s place, and the adders 
win the civil war” (Lucan, Pharsalia 9.850–51). Lucan goes 
on, however, to state that the violence inflicted upon 
these men was not the fault of nature, for this was a no 
man’s land, quite literally. He writes, “We are trespass-
ers in a land of serpents: let us pay the penalty to that 
unknown Power which loathes the traffic of nations, and 
therefore fenced off a region with a scorching zone on 
one hand and the shifting Syrtes on the other, and set 
death in the strip between the two” (Lucan, Pharsalia 
9.859–62).
Crossing the desert at any point made a traveler vul-
nerable to being caught in a sandstorm, as were Cato’s 
miserable men. This storm, recounted in detail, stopped 
his troops in their tracks, before obliterating those tracks 
altogether (Lucan, Pharsalia 9.471–96). Crossing the 
northern Sahara in the spring, however, was especially 
difficult because of the fifty days of winds, which reached 
top speeds of 145 km an hour and sent temperatures 
skyrocketing. Such storms caused great hardships for 
Napoleon’s troops and also for European troops fighting 
in North Africa during World War II. They likewise posed 
hazards to marine travel along an already treacherous 
shore.
The temperatures in the Northern Sinai too were 
no help to the traveler, as they range from mostly just 
over freezing in the winter to as high as 43 °C in July. 
From late spring until early fall, then, traveling dur-
ing the day would have placed one at risk of heatstroke 
and dehydration—the latter state being aggravated by 
the difficulties obtaining water, as will be addressed 
momentarily.
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The hot sand and stony surface must have made travel 
across the desert extremely uncomfortable in antiquity, as 
boots and sandals were, of course, hand made of natural 
materials, which lacked the durability of their more mod-
ern counterparts. Even today, however, such journeys are 
tough on shoes. De León places an unexpected emphasis 
on shoes in his work on border crossers because of his 
belief that shoes are the closest one can get to an archae-
ology of injuries and to a phenomenology of suffering. 
Abandoned shoes speak of painful journeys up until the 
point at which they were discarded, and they speak to an 
even greater pain thereafter—for no one would think to 
carry an extra pair of shoes when they could devote space 
in their rucksacks to water. In interviews with migrants, 
De León found that those who could not keep up with the 
group because of blisters and worn out shoes were often 
left behind—a fate that constituted a veritable death 
sentence (De León 2015: 180–82; Fig. 6).
While finds of leather or papyrus footwear along the 
North Sinai transit route have yet to be attested, descrip-
tions of campaign hardships make mention of them. Thus 
in the late third millennium BCE, an official named Weni 
boasted that under his watch the soldiers he supervised 
plundered from those they passed neither bread nor 
sandals (Simpson 2003: 404). Likewise a New Kingdom 
satire—meant to discourage scribes-in-training from 
dropping out of school for a more glamorous career in 
the military—states that when a typical soldier was sum-
moned to go up to Canaan, he could expect to find at the 
border fortress of Tjaru neither sandals nor weapons of 
war (Caminos 1954: 401).
Another item of material culture that De León finds 
with great frequency on his archaeological surveys are 
backpacks and other belongings that are abandoned by 
increasingly distressed travelers who need to lighten 
their loads. Backpacks are important, of course, in 
that those wishing to cross a border surreptitiously 
generally do so on foot, and it is nearly impossible for 
untrained individuals to travel at a good pace over long 
distances with anything much heavier than a ruck-
sack (De León 2015: 147, 190, 206). Significantly, the 
Egyptian word for wanderers, strangers, or fugitives 
(Shemaw) possesses as its determinative a man walking 
stooped under a bundle that he carries at the end of a 
stick (Fig. 7).
Bags and their contents are also, of course, hard to 
recognize in the archaeological record of the North 
Sinai. But we do have a telling account of a Libyan 
leader at the end of the Late Bronze Age, who had 
entered Egypt illegally with his people in the company 
of other Libyan groups and also of armed men from the 
Mycenaean world. At the end of the Late Bronze Age, 
F I G .  6
Leather and papyrus sandals from Egypt’s New Kingdom juxtaposed with a shoe discarded by a migrant in Arizona’s Sonoran Desert.  
(Sandals: Sheikh Abd el-Qurna; courtesy of the Metropolitan Museum, Rogers Fund, 1936; 36.3.234a, b, and .159a, b.  
Photo of Air Jordan shoe by M. Wells, courtesy of the Undocumented Migration Project.)
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increasing aridity and famines were wreaking havoc 
with palace economies far and wide, and, once again, 
people were on the move. To staunch this migration, 
forts had recently been built at intervals along the des-
ert coastal road, and fortified towns now lined the west-
ern edge of the Delta (Habachi 1980).
This motley group of invaders purportedly entered 
the Delta in order to “seek out the necessities (of life) 
for their mouth[s]” and spent their time going about 
the land “fighting to fill their stomachs daily” (Kitchen 
2003:  4). Once Merneptah mounted an army to drive 
them out, and the battle began to turn against them, 
however, their leader fled the scene. According to an 
inscription at Karnak, “The despicable chief of Libu 
stood in fear, his mind fainting – he stood and then 
fled(?) . . . [?abandonin]g his sandals, his bow, and his 
quiver in haste behind [him], and [ever]y thing (that 
was) with him” (Kitchen 2003: 5). The pharaoh heard 
reports that the ruler had apparently fled alone at 
night, incognito—with no plume on his head—and 
that he had no water in his skin to keep him alive. 
Mounted officers had gone off in pursuit but to no 
avail, and the Commandant of the Fortresses of the 
West had sent a missive stating that the fugitive had 
passed by the  fortress in the favor of night in safety 
and that it was not known whether he was alive or dead 
(Kitchen 2003: 6, 12).
Yet another scenario for dropping one’s belongings 
along the desert trail is related by the author of yet 
another scribal satire, who describes what should have 
been a desirable outcome for a soldier: namely, having 
returned from a successful battle, loaded with booty 
that included a foreign woman. But nothing is happy 
in a scribal satire, save the secure life of a scribe. So, 
the soldier’s lot gets even harder. The scribe writes, 
“The foreign woman has fainted through marching 
and is placed upon the soldier’s neck. His haversack is 
dropped, and others take it away, (as) he is loaded with 
a captive-woman.” The hapless soldier does not long 
survive the extra burden and the loss of his belongings, 
and in this scenario he winds up “dead upon the desert-
edges” (Caminos 1954: 402).
F I G .  7
Determinative for the Egyptian word for “wanderer” juxtaposed with a backpack and other material abandoned by migrants  
in Green Valley, Arizona. (Determinative redrawn from Gardiner 1957: 445. Photo of abandoned belongings  
by M. Wells, courtesy of the Undocumented Migration Project.) 
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Leaving for a trek across the Sinai unprepared was a 
dangerous business, but even prepared, the journey was 
difficult. Again, a scribal satire describes the march of a 
soldier from Egypt up to Syria-Palestine, stating that the 
soldier’s “bread and his water are upon his shoulder like 
the load of an ass. . . . The vertebrae of his back are bent 
whilst he drinks of smelly water and halts (only) to keep 
watch” (Caminos 1954: 92). Another satire in the same 
vein adds, “he drinks water every three days, and it is 
smelly and tastes like salt. His body is broken (with) dys-
entery” (Caminos 1954: 401).
For migrants traveling across the Sonoran desert, 
dehydration or dysentery—caused by being driven 
after days of trekking to consume insect ridden water, 
green with algae from troughs—number among the 
top three killers, together with hypothermia and 
drowning (Jimenez 2009: 21; De León 2015: 2, 151). 
Obtaining access to potable water would also have been 
a tremendous problem for those attempting to enter 
Egypt illegally. Interviews with border crossers indi-
cate that most carry only four to eight liters of water, 
as each liter weighs a kilogram (De León 2015: 147, 
271; Richey 2016). Given that it is impossible to carry 
enough water to survive a four-day trek through the 
desert, travelers across the Sinai would have needed to 
refill their waterskins on at least two occasions. Along 
this stretch of desert, however, wells were not only few 
and far between, but quality would no doubt have var-
ied greatly. A well that had been befouled would mean 
death for a traveler who had banked upon its being 
present and potable.
In Sinuhe’s case, just when he was at death’s door from 
dehydration, he was discovered by Bedouin and nursed 
back to health. Sinuhe’s situation would have been much 
more dire, however, in the New Kingdom, when the 
Egyptians seem to have made every effort to secure all 
known water sources with a fortified way station or at the 
very least with armed guards. This system—immortalized 
by Seti I on a wall of the temple of Amun at Karnak (see 
Fig. 3)—allowed Egyptian armies and imperial function-
aries to travel quickly and relatively comfortably across 
the Sinai. Significantly, the reliefs make sure to highlight 
the presence at each fort of a water source, although the 
nature of the various sources remains somewhat ambigu-
ous (Gardiner 1920).
Likewise, archaeology undertaken by the Israeli North 
Sinai survey during the 1970s and 1980s uncovered a gra-
nary capable of holding 40 tons of grain at a site known 
as Bir el-‘Abd. While the site’s Arabic name implies the 
presence of a nearby well, archaeologists also discov-
ered a 10 by 15 m catchment for rainwater. Yet another 
intriguing fort was identified at Haruba site A-289 
(Fig.  8). These two installations were located in two of 
the ten or so clusters of Late Bronze Age date that the 
Israeli team discovered along the North Sinai transit cor-
ridor. Situated roughly a day’s-journey (15–20 km) from 
one another, the clusters typically incorporated some 
state-built structures, smaller campsites, and evidence 
of seasonal Bedouin settlement (Oren 1987; Fig. 9). Since 
the Israeli survey, archaeologists have excavated at the 
northeastern edge of the Delta, but little large-scale work 
has been undertaken further east.
Encounters in the Shatter Zone
Following Israel’s return of the Sinai to Egypt, much of 
its coast has been treated as a militarized border zone. 
Indeed, following the ouster of Hosni Mubarak and the 
F I G .  8
Haruba site A-289, Nineteenth Dynasty Egyptian site along the North 
Sinai ‘Ways of Horus’ military highway. (Drawn after Oren 1987: 88.)
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rise of the Islamic State, the North Sinai has become a 
hotspot for insurgents (BBC Monitoring 2016). Local 
Bedouin are increasingly radicalized both by hardline 
Islam and, perhaps more importantly, by the prospect 
of assistance in destabilizing the state and obtaining 
a greater degree of freedom for their communities. 
Bedouin in Egypt and in numerous other nations tend 
to have an uneasy relationship with the state, as state 
 interests—such as securing a stable tax base and keep-
ing tabs on the movements of people and goods across 
border zones—can conflict with the freedom of move-
ment and the self-determination that constitute core 
components of both Bedouin identity and economy.
Perhaps as part and parcel of their rebellion against 
the state, the local Bedouin appear to be indulging in 
banditry in unprecedented numbers, preying in par-
ticular on vulnerable refuge groups from the Sudan, 
Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea in a manner quite simi-
lar to the way that bandits and smugglers treat border 
crossers in the Sonoran desert as well as at the far side 
of the crocodile-infested waters of the Limpopo River 
(Jimenez 2009: 25, 27; Smith 2008). An article in the 
online version of Der Spiegel, published in 2013, stated 
that there was virtually no government presence or 
policing in the region and that it was entirely in the 
hands of clans—clans that often are at odds with one 
another (Abé 2013). Thus the Sinai today might well 
fall under the category known to political scientists 
as a shatter zone—a region situated at the edges of 
nations—just beyond where the state’s tentacles can 
reach with ease, at least in times of governmental 
stress. Shatter zones are the regions to which fugitives 
flee (Scott 2009: 13).
The Sinai’s position at the margins of the Egyptian 
state likely led to similar dynamics in antiquity. It is no 
doubt significant, for example, that Sinuhe was saved 
from death by Bedouin. As he narrated it, “I heard 
the sound of the lowing of cattle, and I looked upon 
Asiatics. Their bedouin chief recognized me, a man 
who had been in Egypt. He gave me water and boiled 
milk for me, and I went with him to his tribe, and what 
they did for me was good” (Simpson 2003: 56). What is 
important to note is that the Bedouin who discovered 
Sinuhe half dead and recognized him as a high-level 
Egyptian official did not march him right back toward 
the border in order to collect a reward. Instead, he pro-
vided him with aid, eased his passage across the Sinai, 
and sent him on his way. This Bedouin, despite having 
traveled to Egypt on occasion—or perhaps because of 
it—had no love for the state.
Concerning Bedouin, the First Intermediate Period 
king who purportedly penned the Instruction for 
Merikare had this to say: “The vile Asiatic is miserable 
because of the place wherein he is, shortage of water, lack 
of many trees, and the paths thereof difficult because of 
the mountains. He has never settled in one place, but 
plagued by want, he wanders the deserts on foot. He has 
been fighting ever since the time of Horus. He neither 
conquers nor can he be conquered. He does not announce 
the day of fighting, but is like a thief whom society has 
F I G .  9
Sites along the North Sinai that date to the New Kingdom. (Drawn after Oren 1987: 79, fig. 4.) 
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expelled” (Simpson 2003: 161). If Bedouin were prone to 
acting against the state, this may often have occurred 
in a more or less passive manner (such as purposefully 
not turning in a fugitive), but Bedouin also made ideal 
insurgents. Returning to the aforementioned campaign 
of Seti  I, it is notable that one of its aims was to bring 
order to chaos when it came to the Shasu Bedouin. The 
associated texts state, “'The Shasu enemies are plotting 
rebellion! Their tribal leaders are gathered in one place, 
standing on the foothills of Khor, and they are engaged in 
turmoil and uproar. Each one of them is killing his fellow. 
They do not consider the laws of the palace” (Murnane 
1990: 40). Yet another passage makes it clear that the 
hills of the rebels could not be passed on account of the 
Shasu enemies who were attacking.
The ethnonym “Shasu” in Egyptian can be connected 
to verbs meaning “to wander,” while in Canaan’s West 
Semitic language it bore relation to the verb “to plun-
der” (Levy, Adams and Muniz 2004: 66). If one factor 
about Bedouin is that they can neither conquer nor be 
conquered and that they do not observe proper rules of 
war, whatever defeat Seti’s campaign dealt them had no 
hope of being definitive. And Bedouin, if they remained 
hostile to the state, possessed the power to raid its cara-
vans, harass its personnel, and to mire it in small wars 
indefinitely. Thus for Seti, solving this problem would 
have been imperative (Fig. 3 depicts Seti I marching his 
Shasu prisoners of war toward the Egyptian border).
Almost certainly Seti I eventually did what many 
rulers confronted with similar problems have done, 
namely struck a deal with the Bedouin to placate 
them such that they put their desert skills to work for 
the Egyptians rather than against them (or at least 
remained neutral). This could most easily be accom-
plished by hiring them as desert scouts, already a 
longstanding practice with the Medjay-tribesmen who 
hailed from Nubia’s Eastern Desert. Likewise, there are 
numerous historical attestations of Egyptians grant-
ing Bedouin a tax-free status and also paying them 
protection for guarding caravans (Stephans 1853: 167, 
199). Certainly it is notable that archaeological inves-
tigations of Sinai bases show some evidence for the 
presence of local actors as well as Egyptians (Oren 
1987: 94-95). Moreover, a model letter has survived 
in which an Egyptian official is roundly chastised for 
 requisitioning Bedouin scouts and hunters unnecessar-
ily. In order to press home the seriousness of his repri-
mand, the commanding officer warns his subordinate 
that if he does not desist in this behavior immediately 
he will be surrendered to this group as their convict—
a threat calculated, no doubt, to fill him with fear 
(Caminos 1954: 176)!
In this respect, a letter sent to the leaders of the 
Akuyta, a semi-nomadic Nubian group best known for 
raiding Pharaonic expeditions in the Eastern Desert, 
is notable. From this letter, sent by the High Priest of 
Amun around 1100 BCE, it is apparent that Egyptian 
authorities had sought to convert their enemies into 
allies. Thus, this group was now being hired to escort 
and protect teams of gold workers. The letter implies, 
however, that even after this solution, relations were 
still not entirely easy. The High Priest reminded these 
Bedouin of their duty to prevent other Bedouin from 
attacking workers and warned that they “must not 
come in order to create disturbance in the land of 
Egypt” (Wente 1990: 39). Ultimately, however, the High 
Priest knew—as Diocletian would later come to know 
about populations in that same area—that carrots 
produced far more immediate rewards than sticks. For 
this reason, no doubt, the letter ends with a long list of 
items, foodstuffs, and livestock that he was dispatching 
along with the letter.
Such tactics of cooption and appeasement were no 
doubt politically astute, for just as the Bedouin helped 
Sinuhe flee Egypt, the very first successful invasions 
against the country—which were mounted by the 
Assyrians and Persians—were only successful because 
their leaders first solicited the help of Bedouin. In his 
annals, the Assyrian king Esarhaddon described how the 
king of Arabia provided him with camels loaded down 
with water containers for his invasion of Egypt in 671 
BCE. Even with this help, however, the journey was hard, 
and the king gave full credit to the god Marduk for keep-
ing his troops alive (Pritchard 1974: 292).
Cambyses likewise, according to Herodotus, sought 
inside information as to how he should cross the des-
ert. His informer “advised Cambyses to send and ask 
the king of the Arabians for a safe passage” (Herodotus, 
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Hist. 3.4.3). Their help, as he pointed out, was invaluable 
as in one “wonderously waterless” stretch of desert, the 
nearest wells were three days journey apart. Thus the 
Arab king “filled camel-skins with water and loaded all of 
his camels with these; then he drove them into the water-
less land and there awaited Cambyses’ army” (Herodotus, 
Hist. 3.9.1). The fact that Egypt became vulnerable to 
invasion by land precisely at the point that camels arrived 
onto the scene in the ancient Near East is no accident. 
Clearly, however, even without camels, Bedouin could be 
dangerous if left uncourted, having the power to harass 
travelers and mount lightening razzias on caravans and 
settlements.
In the end, Sinuhe managed a successful escape from 
Egypt. Like an estimated 92–98% of border crossers in the 
Sonoran desert, he evaded the wall with its border agents, 
and he survived his trek across the desert (De León 2015: 
160). At the time at which he crossed, the Egyptians relied 
almost exclusively on their wall to make border crossing 
difficult and on the desert to make it untenable. Successes 
like Sinuhe’s, however, may have led to the eventual ratch-
eting up of defenses in an attempt to co-opt all water 
sources and to close off the border to all unauthorized 
travelers. In this decision, then, Egypt’s policy makers 
may have resembled many members of the United States 
Congress. In a speech given in 2011, President Obama 
joked that Republican lawmakers were difficult to satisfy 
when it came to border defense systems. They kept moving 
the goal posts, first demanding that the numbers of border 
control agents be tripled or quadrupled, then pushing for 
the construction of a higher fence, then a moat, and then, 
finally, to top it off, he predicted that they would demand 
alligators in that moat.3 While this is, of course, a fitting 
hyperbole, it reminds us that among the most brutally 
effective of a state’s agents are the vipers and other non-
human actors that (still) fight in Caesar’s place.
Notes
1. For discussions that emphasize the political nature of the 
literature ascribed to the First Intermediate Period, see 
Moreno Garcia 1997 and Moeller 2005.
2. See for example Gabe Shivone’s article “Death as 
‘Deterrence’: The Desert as a Weapon,” published online for 
the Alliance for Global Justice.
3. A transcript and video of the speech can be found at http://
nation.foxnews.com/president-obama/2011/05/10/obama-
republicans-want-moat-alligators-border. Accessed December 
31, 2016.
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